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ABSTRACT
The Human Genome Project generated oceans of DNA
sequence data and spurred a multinational race to grab the
bounties of these oceans. In response to these DNA property grabs,
UNESCO, drawing upon international law precedents addressing
analogous grabs in the past, declared the Human Genome the
heritage of humanity. The UNESCO Declaration provided, first,
that the heritage shall not, in its natural state, give rise to financial
gains and, second, that countries establish an international
framework to make the benefits from genome research available to
all. This iBrief will first examine Grotius’s Mare Liberum to
determine whether international law precedent indeed bars the
private appropriation of a common heritage. Second, the iBrief
will revisit the framework developed by Pardo for the exploitation
of the mineral resources of the ocean floor and analyze whether it
could serve as a model for an international framework for sharing
the benefits of current genome research.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
The completion of the Human Genome Project (HGP) has
generated oceans of DNA data. These oceans, however, have proven prone
to exploitation through fishery and piracy. In the early stages of the HGP,
the U.S. National Institute of Health (NIH) claimed ownership of the DNA
sequence data, triggering a multinational race to the patent office. 2 While
the NIH eventually abandoned its patent applications, private firms have
since staked their own claims to DNA fragments covering most of the genes
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in the human body. 3 The claims have been met with severe criticism.
Specifically, the scientific community has made a compelling case that
many of the claimed fragments lack utility. 4 However, in focusing on the
statutory patent law requirements of novelty, non-obviousness, utility and
enabling disclosure, a more fundamental issue has been largely ignored: Are
the DNA sequences of the human genome patentable subject matter per se?
One fundamental objection to the patentability of the Human Genome does
not stem from patent law but rather is suggested by international solutions
to previous races to grab the bounties of the human heritage.
¶2
In the 17th century Spain and Portugal claimed the right to exclude
all foreigners from navigating or entering the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. 5
In 1602 the Dutch East India Company (VOC) was formed, and as it
attempted to trade with the East Indies, its vessels came into competition
with those of the Portuguese. 6 When the VOC seized a large Portuguese
galleon in the Strait of Malacca, located between present-day Sumatra and
Malaysia, it had to convince its potential allies of the legality of its seizure. 7
To that end the VOC commissioned Hugo Grotius to write a defense of the
Free Seas. Grotius’s tractate, Mare Liberum, was to rule the waves for over
three centuries, until its laissez faire laissez passer implications triggered a
second race to grab the bounties of the human heritage.
¶3
The second race began in 1873 when “the Challenger expedition
discovered the presence of potato-sized manganese nodules scattered across
large areas of the sea-bed.” 8 It was not long before technological
improvements increased the opportunities for prospecting, exploring and
exploiting these resources. These developments prompted the US to claim
3
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ownership of the natural resources of the continental shelf beneath the high
seas. 9 This proclamation triggered a proliferation of similar claims by other
nations. 10 Following these claims by nations, a private company, US Deep
Sea Ventures Inc., claimed exclusive mining rights to a specified nodule
deposit in the Pacific. 11 This race to privatize the bounties of the Deep
Seabed urged Arvid Pardo, in his seminal address delivered to the United
Nations General Assembly, to propose that the resources of the deep seabed
be declared the common heritage of mankind. 12 Under Pardo’s proposal,
the exploitation of this heritage was to be controlled by an international
authority, as a trustee for all countries and for the benefit of mankind. 13
Drawing on Pardo’s proposal, the United Nations, faced with the
multinational race to grab the bounties of the Human Genome, has endorsed
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human
Rights (Declaration) 14 stating, in a symbolic sense, 15 that the human
genome is the heritage of humanity. 16 The Declaration stipulates that the
human genome, in its natural state, shall not give rise to financial gains 17
and that an international framework be established to make the benefits of
research on the genome available to all. 18 The Declaration, however, raises
two, interrelated, questions.
¶4

¶5
First, the assumption underlying the prohibition on financial gain is
that the common heritage principle bars private appropriation of the
9
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concerned heritage. Part I of this iBrief will analyze whether this
assumption is correct by revisiting Grotius’s Mare Liberum. As this iBrief
will demonstrate, Grotius’s doctrine offers a surprisingly up-to-date
framework by which to decide whether, to put it in Grotian terms, a
common heritage is indeed a res omnium communis, incapable of
appropriation, or a res nullius, exploitable on a “first come, first serve”
basis.
¶6
Second, the litmus test of the common heritage principle is how it
can be reduced to practice. The Declaration stipulates that nation states
create a framework of international cooperation between established and
developing countries. However, while the Declaration lists a few measures
that States should pursue in creating such a framework, 19 it fails to provide
a concrete structure for States to build upon. 20 As one possible solution,
organizations have proposed a global genome trust. 21 For example, the U.S.
National Research Council has suggested that the interests of donors of
human DNA samples, collected from populations across the globe, could be
represented by an international organization that would serve as a trustee
and fund-holder for all the sampled populations. 22 Additionally, a number
of scientists recently urged the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) to examine new, open collaborative development models for DNA
data, because excessive, unbalanced, or poorly designed intellectual
property protections may be counter-productive. 23 Part II of this iBrief will
examine the viability of these proposals by revisiting the foremost example
of an application of the common heritage principle: Pardo’s solution to the
appropriation of the deep seabed resources.

I. CAN A COMMON HERITAGE BE APPROPRIATED? MARE LIBERUM
AND THE RIGHT TO FISH
A. Mare Liberum: Context, Natural Law and Rationale
On February 25, 1603, Jacob van Heemskerck, a Dutch Admiral
employed by the Dutch East India Company (VOC), seized the Santa

¶7
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Catharina, a rich laden Portuguese galleon, in the straits of Malacca. 24 The
matter was vital to the upstart VOC, as it attempted to trade with the East
Indies at a time when Spain and Portugal, then united under one crown, had
claimed the right to exclude all foreigners from navigating the Pacific and
Indian Oceans. 25 To convince potential allies of the legality of the capture,
the VOC retained the twenty-one year-old Grotius to write a defense that
would hold across the globe. 26 Admitted to the Bars of Holland and
Zeeland at the age of 17, Grotius framed his defense as a lawyer’s brief. He
brought his case before the double tribunal of “Conscience, or the innate
estimation of oneself, and Public Opinion, or the estimation of others.” 27
He appealed to the law that “is not difficult to find” but is “the same among
all nations; and . . . is easy to understand, seeing that it is innate in every
individual and implanted in his mind.” 28 In brief, Grotius turned to natural
law, as opposed to the man-made laws of a specific nation or jurisdiction. In
Grotius’s opinion, the laws of nature were particularly persuasive because
they had not been “graven on tablets of bronze or stone” but were “written
in the minds and on the hearts of every individual, where even the unwilling
and the refractory must read them.” 29 To build his case of natural law,
Grotius drew on a variety of authorities, including Spanish jurists,
theologicians, and Roman law precedents.
¶8
Grotius began his tractate by proclaiming what he called the
“specific and unimpeachable axiom of the Law of Nations, called a primary
rule or first principle . . . . Every nation is free to travel to every other
nation, and to trade with it.” 30 To illustrate the universal and timeless
nature of this principle, Grotius described a series of wars waged throughout
history over restrictions on the right to travel. For example, Moses and the
Israelites fought the Amorites for denial of “innocent passage through their
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territory.” 31 Agamemnon and the Greeks attacked the king of Mysia on the
ground that "high roads were free by nature." 32 Finally, the Germans were
reported by Tacitus to have accused the Romans of barring all access to "the
rivers and roads, and almost the very air of heaven." 33 In addition to
providing some historical context for his principle, Grotius also explained
the rationale behind the principle. He pointed out that the necessities of life
had been unevenly spread around the globe and that some nations had
developed skills that other nations lacked. 34 Grotius thus took the
“interdependence” between the nations of the world as the main legal
underpinning of free trade. He also took the argument to its logical
extension; mutual interdependence required free trade and free trade in turn
required free access to the element over which connecting roads were
running, in casu the High Seas. 35

B. Mare Liberum: The Genesis of Property
Grotius distinguished three different terms used to signify the legal
status of the sea. The sea was either “the property of no one (res nullius), or
a common possession (res communis), or public property (res publicae).” 36
These classifications followed the classifications set forth in traditional
Roman law. Res nullius formed part of the larger class of res extra
commercium, or properties that did not form part of the estate of a specific
individual. 37 However, these properties could be appropriated and become
part of an individual estate. 38 Res communes omnium were things
belonging to everybody: the air, floating water, the sea and the shore. 39
“No one could own these things, but they could be used and enjoyed by
everyone.” 40 Res publicae were the rivers and the ports. 41
¶9

¶10
For a full comprehension of the legal implications of these terms,
Grotius traced their origin and evolution. Citing Cicero and Horace, he
noted that in the beginning there was no particular right and nothing was
private property. 42 The fields were not separated by borders and “every
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path was free, all things were used in common.” 43 The rationale behind
this original freedom, according to the early philosophers, was simply that
nature or God had given all things to the human race and not to any
individual in particular. 44 This notion of original freedom, however, shifted
over time as people started to use consumables. 45 According to Grotius, the
first category of consumables comprised food and drinks. 46 Grotius
claimed there could be no use of these things without a certain kind of
ownership. 47 They must belong exclusively to a given individual in a way
that precludes their use by another person. Once moveable consumables
became subject to possession, immovables such as fields and buildings
could not “remain unapportioned.” 48 While their use did not result in their
consumption, they were necessary for the production and consumption of
consumables. 49 Ultimately, they too were in such scarce supply that they
could not “satisfy the use of everybody indiscriminately.” 50 Things that in
former times had been held in common could now be deemed the property
of individuals once they had occupied them. 51
Typically, it was sufficient if, after taking physical possession, the
individual maintained the intention to possess. In the event, however, of
things that resisted seizure, like wild animals, the occupation had to be
uninterrupted. 52 Consequently, “possession of movables implie[d] seizure,”
whereas possession of immovables required the determination of
boundaries. 53 This transformation from common to private property was
followed by the development of public property. Public property exhibited
characteristics of both common and private property. While public property
was technically owned by a particular state, it was usually free for all
citizens of the state to use. Interestingly, both private and public property
arose in the same way and did not mutually exclude each other. Grotius
observed, for example, that the land of Athens belonged to the Athenians
but that the same land was split among individual owners. 54
¶11

¶12
Grotius reached two conclusions from these definitions of property.
“[F]irst, that which cannot be occupied, or which never has been occupied,
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cannot be the property of anyone, because all property has arisen from
occupation.” 55 Second, “all that which has been so constituted by nature
that although serving some one person it still suffices for the common use
of all other persons, is today and ought in perpetuity to remain in the same
condition as when it was first created by nature.” 56 Based on these
conclusions, Grotius then listed many objects that by nature were open to
the use of all; the water, the sun, the air and the waves. 57 All of these were
not susceptible to occupation, and their common use was destined for all.

C. Mare Liberum and the Right to Fish
¶13
As a res omnium communes the sea seems incapable of private
exploitation. This is not an absolute, however. While some things created
by nature for the use of mankind remain common to all, other things may,
through the industry and labor of each man, become his own. 58 Grotius
argued that if any part of a common good is capable of occupation, it may
become the occupant’s private property. 59 He turned to various classical
writers for support for this argument, of whom Plautus put it most
eloquently:

When the slave says: ‘The sea is certainly common to all persons’, the
fisherman agrees, but when the slave adds: ‘Then what is found in the
common sea is common property’, he rightly objects, saying: “But
what my net and hooks have taken, is absolutely my own.” 60
¶14
Fish become property of the first taker, for two reasons. First, the
uncertainty of ownership could not otherwise be avoided. 61 Second, it was
equitable that a premium be put on diligent labor and industry. 62 However,
the private property derived from the occupation of a suitable part of a
common good is not absolute. Any occupation or private appropriation is
conditional on the satisfaction of two fundamental imperatives. First,
necessity, such as famine, may make common again things formerly owned
privately. 63 Necessity, according to Grotius, “reduces everything to the
natural law, because the mother of positive law is utility and utility should
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reprinted in THE FREE SEA, at 116 (David Armitage ed., Liberty Fund, Inc.,
2004).
62
Id. at 116.
63
Id. at 86.
56

2006

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 8

yield to necessity.” 64 “By this law, if food becomes scarce on board a
ship,” Grotius wrote, “what each man has, is gathered in a common
store.” 65 Second, a part of a common good will only become private
property to the extent that such occupation does not impair its common
use. 66 For example, the Roman praetors were able to grant their subjects
the right to occupy the shores within the limits of the Roman Empire. 67
However, these Romans did not have the right to prevent anyone else from
accessing the shore and doing all things that were traditionally considered
permissible. Applying this standard to the case of the fisherman, the
fisherman could claim private property on the fish his nets and hooks have
taken, as long as he does not impair the common use of the fish in the sea.
Put another way, he may not preclude anyone else from fishing. In
addition, he is subject to any public rule purporting to conserve fishing
stocks because the rule is intended to protect the common good.
In addition to the mutual interdependence, Grotius offered another
rationale for the Mare Liberum. Countering the oft-made argument that his
work is an oratio pro domo for the Dutch, 68 he points out that the case he is
making “is the more reasonable, because their (the Dutch) advantage in this
matter is bound up with the advantage of the whole human race, an
advantage the Portuguese are trying to destroy.” 69 He asserts that the
competition he is advocating reduces the profits of monopolists, “to the
corresponding advantage of all other men.” 70 In other words, the Mare
Liberum and the competition it allows serves mankind in the most
beneficial manner.
¶15

¶16
Applying Mare Liberum to the efforts to patent the human genome,
the status of the Human Genome as a res omnium would not, per se, bar
private appropriation of parts thereof, provided such appropriation does not
impair its common use and provided that the privatized parts could become
common again in the case of an emergency. These two conditions provide
for a remarkable up-to-date, if inarticulate, framework to govern the
exploitation of the human genome. First, under the “no impairment to
common use” test, any claims to appropriate all or a part of raw genomic
sequences making up the human genome would be invalid; as such claims
would certainly impair common use of the human genome. Second, the
“necessity” test provides ample justification to address any “necessities or
emergencies that might arise as a result of abusive use of appropriated
64
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sequences, as may the case with genetic test, by rendering common again
things formerly owned.” 71 A discussion of how “recommonization” takes
place (e.g. research exemption, compulsory licensing) is beyond the scope
of this iBrief.
Not surprisingly, the Mare Liberum was met with criticism. 72
Specifically, Grotius’s contemporaries argued that the Mare Liberum was a
cover, proclaiming in fact a liberty common to all nations to fish
indifferently on all kinds of seas. 73 One commentator, William Welwod,
argued that community property bred disagreement and that whatever is
owned communally is neglected due to natural viciousness.74 This argument
was more fully articulated four centuries later when Garrett Hardin
published The Tragedy of the Commons. 75 Welwod also pointed out that
community property carried with it the difficulty of administration,76 a point
that will become more manifest in Part II.
¶17

II. HOW TO EXPLOIT A COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND: LESSONS
LEARNED FROM PARDO
A. Exploitation of the Common Heritage: the North vs. the South
¶18
Having established that the Common Heritage principle does not
bar appropriation per se, we will now apply the litmus test of the common
heritage principle: How can it be reduced to practice? The Declaration
stipulates that the benefits of genome research be made available to all and
that nation states establish a framework of international co-operation with
developing countries. 77 While the Declaration itself fails to work out the
details for such a framework, some commentators have proposed the
establishment of a global genome trust. 78 For example, the U.S. National
Research Council has suggested that the interests of donors of human DNA
samples, collected from populations across the globe, could be represented
by an international organization that would serve as a trustee and fundholder for all the sampled populations. 79 Patents would be issued in the
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name of this trustee organization, and the trustee would grant licenses to
any party willing to share a portion of the net proceeds from products made
from any patented gene, gene sequence or cell line with the trustee
organization. The trustee organization, in turn, would be required to ensure
that the licensing revenue benefited the participating populations, which
would have representatives in the trustee organization. 80 This section will
examine the viability of the trustee by revisiting the foremost example of an
application of the common heritage principle: Pardo’s solution to the
appropriation of the deep-seabed resources.
¶19
Under Pardo’s proposal, the bounties of the deep seabed would be
declared “the common heritage of mankind.” 81 In order to effectively
manage the common heritage, Pardo required a properly established
international regime to assure peaceful use, orderly exploitation in the
interests of mankind, with particular regards to the needs of poor countries,
and freedom of research, with the results available to all. 82 The
international regime would act as a trustee for all countries over the oceans
and the ocean floor. 83 The agency was to be endowed with wide powers to
regulate, supervise and control all activities on or under the ocean and the
ocean floor. 84 It was to also have the power to regulate the commercial
exploitation of the ocean floor by issuing exploration rights. 85 Pardo’s
proposal prompted the United Nations to start negotiations that would create
such an international regime during the Convention on the Law of the
Seas. 86
¶20
Throughout the proceedings of the Convention, a key controversial
issue was how the resources of the deep seabed, having been declared the
common heritage of mankind, were to be exploited. 87 Did Pardo’s common
heritage principle comport with collectivist or unilateral exploitation? Or as
Baslar put it: “The crux of the issue since the advent of the common

80

Id.
Address by Arvid Pardo to the 22nd session of the General Assembly of the
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82
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UN GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
83
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heritage of mankind has always been about what kind of model of
management would best serve the common interest.” 88
The issue divided the North from the South. 89 Most developed
countries in the North held the view that, pending the negotiations that were
to lead to the adoption of the Convention, unilateral mining of the mineral
resources of any area of the sea beyond the limits of national jurisdiction
could proceed as a permissible exercise of the freedom of the high seas. 90
Under the northern view and international law as it then stood, the main
beneficiaries of mining would be a handful of developed States, regardless
of whether the source of international law was the flexible “exploitability
criterion” set forth in the 1958 Convention, the res communis doctrine or
under the res nullius. 91
¶21

¶22
In contrast to the northern view, most developing countries from the
South argued that the deep seabed resources were unique and belonged to
the whole of mankind. 92 They employed the common heritage of principle
as a tool to implement the ideas underlying the establishment of the New
International Economic Order (NIEO) 93 set forth in the 1974 Declaration by
the United Nations General Assembly. 94 The UN resolution provided that a
new international economic order should be founded on several enumerated
principles, particularly sovereignty over national resources in developing
countries. 95 The NIEO provided for a comprehensive alteration of the
world economic system, claiming that the disparities in income between
states are unjust and caused by unfair economic arrangements. 96 The
proposed wealth transfer from the North to the South was justified on the
rationales of charity and/or guilt. 97 The arguments of the South were
supplemented by some observers from the North, appealing to self-interest;
that relieving poverty in the South by transferring wealth would help build
markets for Northern exports and avoid conflicts and mass immigration. 98
88
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As part of the implementation of the NIEO, the South then advanced a
novel variant of the res communis doctrine. The model would permit the
South to control and appropriate the benefits of exploitation and give it
access to the technology necessary to exploit the resources, despite its
inability to contribute to seabed development. 99 As Pardo had suggested,
this required the establishment of an international seabed authority that was
to have the power to engage in seabed mining and to control mining by
licensees. 100
¶23
The resultant United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(Convention) 101 predominantly supported the goals of the South and the
NIEO. The communist countries initially denounced the creation and
administration of a “common ownership of all mankind” as one more
international machinery serving the predatory aims of capitalists’
monopolies. 102 Yet, the centralized production regime created under the
Convention could hardly be called anything but communistic. As one
commentator has observed, the full complexity of the system proposed
under the Convention can “only be fully appreciated by reading through the
provisions of Part XI, Annexes III and IV, and the two Resolutions.” 103 For
purposes of our reality check of analogous proposals for the exploitation of
the human genome however, a summary of the system is provided in the
following section.

B. The Convention: Governance and Research of the Common
Heritage
¶24
The Convention created a legal regime governing the prospecting,
exploration and exploitation of deep seabed mining. 104 The Convention
declared the “Area” and its resources the common heritage of mankind and
establishes a supranational Authority with taxing and licensing powers and
the right to mandate technology transfer. 105 The Area was defined as the

99

Id. at 48.
CHURCHILL, supra note 8, at 228.
101
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397.
102
View expressed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the 23rd session
of the General Assembly (1968), 1592nd meeting of the First Committee, in
OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS, THE LAW OF THE SEA: CONCEPT
OF THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND 49 (United Nations 1996).
103
CHURCHILL, supra note 8, at 231.
104
See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 (Part XI and Annexes III, IV and V, containing basic conditions of
prospecting, exploration and exploitation and the statute of the Enterprise)
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
105
Id. at art. 156-57.
100

2006

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 8

seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction. 106 Under the common heritage doctrine, Nation-States would
become stakeholders in the Ocean commons and all rights in the resources
of the Area were vested in mankind as a whole. 107 No State could “claim or
exercise sovereignty over any part of the Area or its resources” except in
accordance with the Convention, the Charter of the United Nations and in
the interests of maintaining peace and security and promoting international
cooperation and mutual understanding. 108
¶25
The Convention granted plenary power to the International Seabed
Authority (Authority), which was composed of all States Parties to the
Convention. 109 The Authority was divided into three principal organs: the
Assembly, the Council, and Secretariat. 110 The Assembly was the plenary
body composed of all Authority members; it elected the Council and
Secretary-General, assessed contributions, gave final approval to the rules
and regulations of the Authority, approved the budget, and decided on the
sharing of mining revenues received by the Authority. 111 Each nation
received one vote in the Authority. 112 The Council was the executive body
of the Authority and had primary responsibility for the administration of
seabed mining regime. 113 It approved work plans for mining and developed
rules for the equitable sharing of the financial benefits to be derived from
the seabed. 114 The Council was assisted by an Economic Planning
Commission and a Legal and Technical Commission. 115 As the operating
arm, carrying out mining, transport, processing and marketing activities in
the seabed directly, the Convention introduced the mining entity: the
Enterprise. 116 The Enterprise, through mandatory transfer, was guaranteed
access on request to seabed mining technology owned by private
companies. The Authority was financed by contributions from members,
funds received in connection with its activities and from the Enterprise. 117
The Enterprise was to be subsidized by the signing nations and compete
against its licensees. 118 The initial costs of setting up the institutional
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infrastructure of the mining regime were estimated to range between $ 350
and $700 million. 119
¶26
Under the Convention, states and international organizations have a
general right to conduct marine scientific research, subject to its provisions,
and a general obligation to promote scientific research and cooperate in the
conduct of research. 120 Groups wishing to prospect could do so only if they
complied with the Convention and the rules of the Authority concerning
certain training programs. 121 These programs related to marine scientific
research and programs for the transfer of technology to the Enterprise and to
developing States with regard to activities in the Area. 122 They further
included facilitating the access of the Enterprise and developing States to
the relevant technology under fair and reasonable terms and conditions. 123
The prospector was also required to notify the Authority of the proximate
area of his prospecting activities. 124 Prospecting could be conducted
simultaneously by more than one prospector in the same area or areas. 125
While prospecting did not confer any rights on the prospector with respect
to resources, a prospector could recover a reasonable quantity of minerals to
be used for testing. 126

C. The Convention: Terms of Exploitation of the Common Heritage
¶27
Only the Enterprise, States Parties, and their private enterprises
could apply to the Authority for approval of plans to work in the Area. 127 In
order to be eligible for exclusive exploration and exploitation rights, an
operator had to meet certain qualification standards. 128 While the
Enterprise could apply to prospect any part of the Area, other applicants
were restricted to certain reserved portions of the Area and were subject to a
host of additional requirements. 129 Each application, other than those
submitted by the Enterprise or by any other entities for reserved areas, had
119
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to cover a total area “sufficiently large and of sufficient estimated
commercial value to allow two mining operations.” 130 The Authority could
accord the operator the exclusive right to explore and exploit one of the two
sites, with respect to a specified category of resources and enter into a
contract with the applicant incorporating that plan (the “parallel system”).
131
If the Authority granted exploitation rights to one site, it had to
designate the other site as “reserved area.” 132 The Enterprise would then be
given the opportunity to decide whether it would carry out activities in a
reserved area. 133 Both exploration and exploitation could only be carried
out in areas specified in the above plans and in accordance with the terms of
a contract to be concluded between the Authority and the operator. 134
¶28
In addition to the previously mentioned provisions, the Convention
included a number of other stipulations and requirements. For instance, the
Convention established a fifteen-year limit on the annual production of
seabed nickel. 135 The underlying motivation for the limit was to protect the
prices and production levels produced by less-developed land-mining
countries, heavily dependent on export-income. 136 The Convention also
required applicants to make technology available to the Enterprise and
developing States which it used in seabed activities, on fair and reasonable
commercial terms, if the Enterprise could not obtain such technology on the
open market. 137 As a general principle, the Annex prescribed that “title to
minerals shall pass upon recovery in accordance with the Convention.” 138
Title to all minerals in the Area fundamentally belonged to mankind as a
whole. 139 Title to the minerals could then vest in the person that recovered
them from the Area, provided that person complied with the provisions of
the Convention. 140 It would be up to the Authority to provide for the
equitable sharing of financial and other economic benefits derived from
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activities in the Area through any appropriate mechanism. 141 In addition,
the Convention provided for detailed regulation of data transfer 142 and
training programs and promoted the acquisition, dissemination and
development of marine technological knowledge, including measures to
help transfer this technology to developing countries. 143

D. The 1994 Amendment Agreement
¶29
As observed by one commentator, no sketch could do justice to the
baroque architecture of the Convention. 144 Not surprisingly perhaps,
several industrialized states refrained from signing the Convention, due to
its exceptionally precise regulations and precedential impact. 145 When the
developing states started to realize that they would have to bear the costs
associated with the institutional architecture, informal negotiations were
launched in search of a compromise. 146 In the Post Cold War neo-liberal
climate of the early nineties, these negotiations resulted in the 1994
Implementation Agreement. 147 This Agreement simplified the structure of
the Authority, provided for additional safeguards to protect the interests of
the mining community and replaced the mandatory technology transfer
provisions with a set of guidelines. 148 These guidelines obliged contractors
to cooperate with the Authority in obtaining technology for the Enterprise
and developing States on fair and reasonable terms, consistent with the
effective protection of intellectual property rights. 149 The Agreement
further eliminated production limits and provided that the Enterprise and
commercial miners would stand on an equal footing, neither being
subsidized. 150 All other provisions of the Convention remained intact.
Although a few prospecting agreements have been concluded with pioneer
investors, to date, even under the terms as modified by the 1994 Agreement,
the framework for the exploitation of the deep seabed resources has failed to
attract any significant investment. 151 This lack of investment is primarily
due to market developments and the discovery of substantial new land141
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based reserves of nickel, copper and cobalt. 152 Yet, it seems safe to assume
that the baroque architecture of the framework and the associated
uncertainty over return on investment contributed to the demise of the
Convention. 153
¶30
The lessons learned from Pardo’s proposal are evident if the reader
contemplates the enormities of the application of the system established by
the Convention, mutatis mutandis, to the exploitation of the human genome.
Apart from the sheer number of provisions and their level of detail, they
took almost twenty-five years to negotiate. This is certainly too long for
those involved in the biomedical research enterprise, researchers, companies
and patients alike, to wait before moving genome knowledge from the
bench to the market-place. While the efforts of Celera, the company that
improperly threatened to privatize the entire genome, should be deplored for
attempting to remove raw genomic sequence date from the public domain,
the company’s slogan that speed matters can hardly be denied. This, of
course, is not to suggest that no international cooperation is possible. The
successful completion of the HGP by the International Consortium bears
testimony to the contrary. However, when establishing an international
framework for the commercialization of the human genome and the sharing
of any benefits, by way of a global fund or trust, the lesson to be learned
from the Convention is that such a framework may be prone to
overregulation due to the number of stakeholders involved and the
divergence of their interests and views.
¶31
Notably, one result of the Convention’s failure to reach a lasting
solution has been the creation of a much simpler mechanism to achieve
benefit-sharing. Various states have imposed a tax on the removal of deep
seabed minerals. For example, the U.S. Deep Seabed Hard Mineral
Resources Act of 1980 imposed a tax on any removal of a hard mineral
resource from the deep seabed pursuant to a deep seabed permit. 154 In a
similar fashion, I have proposed a special tax on tissue and cell products
that have been directly developed from human sources. 155 Taxation is an
effective, if indirect, mechanism for distributing the benefits of a particular
activity throughout a community. The proceeds of such a tax could be
earmarked to sustain, for example, government subsidies of affordable
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healthcare insurance or orphan disease programs, to make the advances of
genome research available to all. 156

CONCLUSION
¶32
The current approach to dealing with the human genome is found in
the UNESCO Declaration. As has been demonstrated, the Declaration
stipulates that the human genome, in its natural state, shall not give rise to
financial gains, implying that the common heritage principle bars private
appropriation. The Declaration also calls for the establishment of a legal
framework aimed at making the benefits of genome research available to
all. However, analysis of international precedents demonstrates, first, that
the lesson learned from Grotius is that the status of a res omnium does not,
per se, render a good incapable of private appropriation, provided such
appropriation does not impair its common use and provided that the
privatized parts could become common again in the case of an emergency.
Second, when establishing an international framework for the exploitation
of the human genome and the sharing of any benefits by way of a global
fund or trust, the lesson learned from Pardo is that such a framework may
be prone to excessive, unbalanced and counter-productive regulation. This
is not only due to the number of stakeholders involved and the divergence
of their interests but also to the sheer number of provisions, the level of
detail of such collectivist frameworks, and the time it takes to negotiate
them. The twenty-five years needed to negotiate a resolution for the
distribution of sea bed resources is too long for a product like the human
genome where speed matters for researchers, companies and patients. A
more plausible way to ensure benefit-sharing could be the introduction of a
tissue tax. Such a system would distribute benefits of genome projects to
the entire world community in an efficient and expeditious manner.
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